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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I try to find ways to improve forensic science by identi-
fying potential vulnerabilities. To this end, I use Francis Bacon’s doctrine of idols, 
which distinguishes between different types of human biases that may prevent scientific 
and objective inquiry. Bacon’s doctrine contains four sources for such biases: idola tri-
bus (idols of the tribe), idola specus (idols of the den or cave), idola fori (idols of the 
market), and idola theatri (idols of the theatre). While his 400-year-old doctrine does 
not, of course, perfectly match up with our current world view, it still provides a pro-
ductive framework for examining and cataloguing some of the potential weaknesses 
and limitations in our current approach to forensic science. 
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  Whether forensic science is actually a “science” has been extensively de-
bated in the academic, professional, and general public media. Often the dis-
cussion is governed by well-entrenched adversaries who are concerned and 
motivated by interest about the outcome and implications of the debate. The 
difficulties are compounded by metatheoretical issues about what constitutes a 
science and the fact that not all sciences are equal and meet well defined and 
strict criteria. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that forensic science is 
not a unitary field; it encompasses a whole spectrum of disciplines, some of 
which are more scientifically based than others. Clearly DNA analysis is more 
scientific than bite-mark and ear-print analysis. 
  With such inherent difficulties and motivational biases (to name just a 
few), I avoid entering the debate that lacks for the most part any meaningful 
impact. I, however, have often wondered if and how a constructive discussion 
can help identify those elements in forensics that are scientific (if any) and 
those elements that are less, or not altogether, scientific (if any). These could 
be very important to forensic science, as they guide the way and erect clear 
signposts of how to improve and become more scientific. In this paper, I try to 
contribute to forensic science by constructively discussing forensic science as 
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a science. I do this by scrutinizing potential vulnerabilities and problems that 
exist within forensic science, in the hopes that by reflecting upon and exam-
ining these issues, I can highlight where improvement is needed. I will not be 
reaching any conclusions on whether forensic science is, or is not, a science. 
Some readers will no doubt be disappointed that I am not concluding that fo-
rensic science is not a science; whereas, others will feel dismay that I am not 
concluding that it is. But whatever value I offer to this debate, it will not be by 
reaching either conclusion, but rather by sidestepping it. 
  It is further important to note that the need for improvement by itself is by 
no means a sign of a lack of scientific rigor; on the contrary, a sign of any 
good science is its constant reflection, criticism, and examination. That is how 
sciences are formed and continue to develop and improve. The goal of my dis-
cussion is to raise questions and identify vulnerabilities that need attention, 
rather than to reach a metaconclusion on whether any particular forensic disci-
pline can, at present, legitimately be called a “science.” 
  To provide a constructive framework for discussing some of these areas 
that may need improvement, I go back to the very foundations of modern sci-
ences. These were laid out in part by Francis Bacon nearly 400 years ago in 
Novum Organum.
1 Certain ways of thinking and analysis preclude scientific 
investigations,  whereas  others  form  the  basis  on  which  science  is  both 
grounded and on which it is contingent. Francis Bacon developed the doctrine 
of “idols,” in which he laid out his understanding of the various obstacles that 
get in the way of truth and science—false idols that prevent us from making 
accurate  observations  and  achieving  understanding.  These  idols  distort  the 
truth, and thus stand in the way of science. He categorized these obstacles into 
four groups: (1) idola tribus (idols of the tribe), (2) idola specus (idols of the 
den or cave), (3) idola fori (idols of the market), and (4) idola theatri (idols of 
the theatre).
2 
  Francis Bacon’s idols should not be confused with fallacies, hallucina-
tions, or mere illusions. Nor should they be conceived in a religious sense as 
false gods. Rather, Bacon probably meant something closer to false ideas that 
prevent us from gaining access to the truth and achieving a more full and accu-
rate understanding of nature. Acknowledging such idols and establishing safe-
guards against them are critical milestones of a science. This is achieved by 
finding  ways  to  detect,  recognize,  and  counter  their  effects.  In  this  way, 
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Francis Bacon’s doctrine of idols helped lay down much of the foundation of 
modern science.
3 
  Bacon’s message was not of skepticism and inability to conduct objective 
inquiries; indeed, he believed that if people were “forewarned of the danger,” 
they could “fortify themselves as far as may be against their assaults.”
4 Per-
haps Bacon was naive in thinking that merely naming and describing these 
idols in itself might counter their powers. Nevertheless, this may well limit the 
idols’ effects, and combined with more actions—such as best practices, correct 
reliance on technology, training, and other related measures—a much more 
scientific and objective endeavor is possible. 
  Each of Francis Bacon’s idols encompasses a different source of potential 
error that may limit us from accessing the truth and achieving a scientific ex-
amination.  Each  idol  produces  specific  vulnerabilities  and  a  distinct  set  of 
counter measures to prevent or minimize its potential powers. For example, 
there are errors that can arise when the method itself falls prey to an idol, and 
there are errors that can arise from the application and execution of the method 
falling prey to an idol. Similarly, there are idols that are inherent to human 
cognition, and there are idols that arise from organizational culture and struc-
ture. In what follows, I will use Francis Bacon’s doctrine of idols as a tool to 
help understand and examine some of the challenges and obstacles facing fo-
rensic science.
5  
 
I. IDOLA TRIBUS (IDOLS OF THE TRIBE) 
   
  For Bacon, obstacles derive from being members of our species, from the 
very fact of our being human. “The idols of the tribe are inherent in human 
nature and the very tribe or race of man; for man’s sense is falsely asserted to 
be the standard of things . . . .”
6 These idols reflect and derive from what is 
common to all of us, from our very nature. They result from our inability to 
look at the world from “outside” of ourselves, to see things as they actually 
are, instead of seeing them as distorted by our own mental processes. Bacon 
explained, “[a]nd the human understanding is like a false mirror, which, re-
ceiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolours the nature of things by min-
                                                                                                           
  3. Bacon is one of a group of scientists from 1500–1700 whose work helped lay down much 
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work.” WILBUR APPLEBAUM, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN 
SCIENCE xv (2005). 
  4. Bacon, True Directions, supra note 1, at 53. 
  5. Since I am using Bacon’s doctrine of idols as a tool, as a framework for discussing foren-
sic science, I will abide by it only loosely, applying it flexibly and pragmatically to this discussion. 
Please note Houck’s application of Bacon’s idols in Max M. Houck, Science and Management: 
Using  Bacon’s  Four  Idols as a  Theory of  Managing  Knowledge  Workers,  KIMBERLY-CLARK 
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800886&u=kcprofessional&issue_id=000177836&lid=b9tgvRQ&uid=b1jnLSF3.  For  a  general 
classification of errors, see Scott A. Shappell & Douglas A. Wiegmann, Applying Reason: The 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), 1 HUM. FACTORS & AEROSPACE 
SAFETY 59 (2001). 
  6. BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM, supra note 1, at 20. Dror 
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gling its own nature with it.”
7 This is a profound recognition of one of the fun-
damental insights of modern cognitive psychology: that the mind is not a cam-
era, that we see selectively, and our understanding is inevitably partial and 
distorted.
8 Indeed, we might say that Bacon’s idola tribus are an inevitable 
consequence of the way that our brains process information and the architec-
ture of cognition that defines our perception, judgments, and decision making.
9 
  Our brain and cognitive processes enabled us to survive and thrive as a 
species over many millions of years. Our flexible capacity to make sense of 
huge amounts of information, to prioritize and chunk information together, to 
draw conclusions even in the face of ambiguous and missing information (to 
name just a few cognitive powers), has underpinned effective and intelligent 
human performance. These special abilities are particularly noticeable and re-
markable with human expertise, such as latent fingerprint examiners.
10 
  These cognitive and brain processes that give rise to intelligence and to 
expertise, however, also generate vulnerabilities.
11 
Expertise is correctly, but one-sidedly, associated with special abilities and 
enhanced performance. The other side of expertise, however, is usually sur-
reptitiously hidden. Along with expertise, performance is also degraded, cul-
minating in a lack of flexibility and error. . . . brain functions and cognitive 
architecture involved in being an expert. . . . the very making of expertise, 
entail [information processing] computational tradeoffs that result in func-
tional degradation [and error].
12 
Francis Bacon acknowledged these idols as standing in the way of scientific 
understanding and observations. The idola tribus are inherent to us and our 
making, and thus, they cannot be directly and totally eliminated. They reflect 
cognitive trade-offs built into our cognitive architecture and brain processes. 
Human intelligence, and in particular expertise, entails mental representations 
and cognitive processes that introduce selectivity and distortions of informa-
tion, as well as a whole range of other cognitive side effects. Thus, superior 
abilities introduced through expertise—paradoxically—also introduce degra-
dation in performance.
13 
  These assets and these vulnerabilities are inherent to the cognitive archi-
tecture and constitute two inevitable sides of the same coin. As such, we can-
not ever eliminate them completely without also eliminating much of our own 
                                                                                                           
  7. Bacon, True Directions, supra note 1, at 54. 
  8. Itiel E. Dror, Perception Is Far from Perfection: The Role of the Brain and Mind in 
Constructing Realities, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 763, 763 (2005). 
  9. See generally id.; Itiel E. Dror & Peter A.F. Fraser-Mackenzie, Cognitive Biases in Human 
Perception, Judgment, and Decision Making: Bridging Theory and the Real World, in CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIVE FAILURES 53 (D. Kim Rossmo ed., 2009). 
  10. See generally Thomas A. Busey & Itiel E. Dror, Special Abilities and Vulnerabilities in 
Forensic Expertise, in THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 15-1 (forthcoming 2010) (this book is being 
published online in stages at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/225320.htm). 
  11. Itiel E. Dror, Paradoxical Functional Degradation in Human Expertise, in THE PARADOXICAL  
BRAIN (Narinder Kapur et al. eds., forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3, on file with author). 
  12. Id. (manuscript at 2, on file with author). 
  13. Id.   Human Biases in Forensic Science 
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cognitive  powers.  What  we  must  do  instead  is  control  and  minimize  them 
through proper training and the development of best practices and procedures 
that directly address these idols. Sequential unmasking, following the principle 
of “keep the processes of data collection and analysis as blind as possible for 
as long as possible,”
14 is an example of a good way to avoid and safeguard, as 
much as possible, against some idola tribus (for example, in DNA analysis). In 
sequential unmasking, idola tribus (as well as other idols discussed in the pa-
per) are minimized by temporarily keeping information from the forensic ex-
perts.
15  Information  is  unmasked  sequentially,  and  with  each  unmasking, 
analysis is conducted and documented.
16 Only then does further unmasking 
take place.
17 
  Cognitive technologies, such as the Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System (AFIS), can also help deal with idols, but only if the technology is cor-
rectly collaborating and distributing cognition between the human expert and 
the technology. “AFIS ought to change the way fingerprint experts conduct 
comparisons, and  what they  require in order to declare a ‘match,’ because 
making identifications is simply not the same cognitive task as it was prior to 
the use of massive, automated computerized databases.”
18 Hence, the changes 
brought about with the increasing use of cognitive technologies may eliminate 
some idols, but they also may modify the way existing idols affect human per-
formance, now causing them to play different roles when technology is in-
volved, as well as introducing new idols that did not exist before.
19 
  Within idola tribus, Francis Bacon recognized the human tendency to en-
gage in what we would now refer to as wishful thinking and confirmation bias: 
what  he  characterized  as  a  natural  inclination  to  accept,  believe,  and  even 
prove what we want to be true, and then rush to conclusions because we want 
them to be true. He warned of how emotions stand in the way of finding the 
truth, as well as cause selective attention to information and limit abilities to 
take in and objectively process all the information. The erroneous identifica-
tion of the Madrid bomber
20 is an example of how idola tribus can indeed 
interfere with observation and analysis. In this case a number of latent finger-
print  examiners  incorrectly  identified  Brandon  Mayfield  as  the  Madrid 
                                                                                                           
  14. Robert Rosenthal, How Often Are Our Numbers Wrong?, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1005, 
1007 (1978). 
  15. See  Dan  E.  Krane  et  al.,  Letter  to  the  Editor:  Sequential  Unmasking:  A  Means  of 
Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006, 1006 
(2008). 
  16. Id. 
  17. Id. 
  18. Itiel E. Dror & Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Use of Technology in Human Expert Domains: 
Challenges and Risks Arising from the Use of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems in 
Forensic Science, LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 5, posted Jan. 22, 
2010, as an Advance Access article on the Law, Probability & Risk Web site). 
  19. See id. 
  20. See generally Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization 
in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706–18 (2004), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2005/special_report/2005_special_report.htm. Dror 
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bomber.
21 In an investigation that followed this error, the Office of the Inspec-
tor General concluded that confirmation bias was a contributing factor in the 
erroneous identification.
22 
  Research  studies  have  well  established  that  confirmation  bias  is  wide-
spread across a great variety of areas and domains.
23 Recent empirical experi-
mentation  specifically  demonstrates  that  idola  tribus  can  affect  fingerprint 
analysis.  When  fingerprints  were  shown  within  an  emotional  context,  they 
were more likely to be judged as a match than when the same fingerprints 
were presented within an emotionally neutral context.
24 These effects, how-
ever, were observed only when the fingerprints were ambiguous and the par-
ticipants in this study were novices.
25 When the fingerprints were clearly a 
match or a nonmatch, the emotional context had no observable effect.
26 Other 
studies further demonstrate that not all emotional contexts, under any condi-
tion, affect decision outcome.
27 
  Indeed, even if the context affects and biases the decision making process, 
it does not necessarily mean that in each and every case the biasing knowledge 
will actually affect the decision outcome.
28 If the bias is in the direction of the 
correct decision, then the evidentiary data may bring the decision considera-
tions past the decision threshold, and the bias will only push the accumulated 
considerations further in the same direction.
29 Even if the bias is in a contra-
dictory direction from the evidentiary data, this does not necessarily mean that 
the bias will lead to an incorrect outcome.
30 It might be, for example, that the 
biasing  information  will  affect  the  considerations  of  the  decision  maker  to 
some extent, but not enough to affect the actual decision. The more ambiguous 
the data, however, the more likely a bias will affect the actual decision.
31 
  Other research, this time with latent fingerprint examiners doing real case-
work, demonstrates that idola tribus are indeed an issue with forensic exami-
nation.
32 This time, however, the pairs of prints were presented in different 
                                                                                                           
  21. Id. 
  22.  OFFICE  OF  THE  INSPECTOR  GEN.,  U.S.  DEP’T  OF  JUSTICE,  A  REVIEW  OF  THE  FBI’S 
HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 144 (2006) [hereinafter OIG]. 
  23. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in 
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). 
  24. Itiel E. Dror et al., When Emotions Get the Better of Us: The Effect of Contextual Top-
Down Processing on Matching Fingerprints, 19 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 799, 805 (2005). 
  25. Id. at 806. 
  26. Id. at 805. 
  27. See, e.g., Lisa J. Hall & Emma Player, Will the Introduction of an Emotional Context 
Affect Fingerprint Analysis and Decision-Making?, 181 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 36 (2008). 
  28. See generally Itiel E. Dror, Letter to the Editor: On Proper Research and Understanding 
of the Interplay Between Bias and Decision Outcomes, 191 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e17 (2009). 
  29. Id. at e17.  
  30. Id. 
  31. See  generally  Itiel  Dror  &  Robert  Rosenthal,  Meta-Analytically  Quantifying  the 
Reliability and Biasability of Forensic Experts, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 900 (2008). 
  32. See, e.g., Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC 
IDENTIFICATION  600  (2006);  Itiel  E.  Dror  et  al.,  Contextual  Information  Renders  Experts 
Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI.  INT’L 74 (2005); Dror & 
Fraser-Mackenzie, supra note 9.   Human Biases in Forensic Science 
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contexts to determine if context affects decision outcomes. Many examiners 
reached different conclusions when the same prints were presented within a 
different context.
33 
  To find the scientific truth, one must find a way to minimize errors that 
“arise  either  from  the  uniformity  of  the  constitution  of  man’s  spirit,  or  its 
prejudices, or its limited faculties or restless agitation, or from the interference 
of the passions, or the incompetence of the senses . . . .”
34 What forensic scien-
tists need to realize is that these idola tribus are within all of us. Their presence 
does not mean that forensic practitioners are failing at their duties. Their pres-
ence does not even make forensic science unscientific. Rather, the presence of 
idola tribus—of the distortions, biases, and knowledge that affect what and 
how we see—is simply part of what it means to be human. And as Bacon sug-
gested to us nearly four centuries ago, recognizing our limits and our cognitive 
imperfections is the first step towards addressing them effectively. 
 
II. IDOLA SPECUS (IDOLS OF THE DEN OR CAVE) 
 
  The idola specus are not, according to Bacon, as inevitable and universal 
as the idola tribus.
35 Instead, these idols vary from one person to another and 
are a function of the individual’s experiences, education, training, and other 
personal traits. Rather than derived from human nature itself, as the idola tri-
bus are, these idols are a function of nurture. Different people, based on their 
specific upbringing, life experiences and professional affiliations, have devel-
oped personal allegiances to groups, ideologies, disciplines, theories, or meth-
odologies. As a result, a person may “corrupt[] the light of nature, either from 
his own peculiar and singular disposition, or from his education and inter-
course with others, or from his reading, and the authority acquired by those 
whom he reverences and admires . . ..”
36 Plato’s cave provides much insight to 
this type of idol and the cultural difficulties in changing it.
37 
  Idola specus perhaps include issues of personal preference and motivation. 
Reasoning, perception, and decision criteria are all affected by motivation and  
preferences.
38 Scientific objectivity may then be compromised by such idols.  
It  is  only  natural  that  examiners  are  motivated  to  find  matches  and  solve 
                                                                                                           
  33. Four out of six examiners changed at least one decision in one study, Dror & Charlton, 
supra note 32, at 610, and four out of five in another study, Dror et al., supra note 32, at 76. For 
their overall analysis, collapsing the data from both studies to quantify the level of idola tribus 
bias, see Dror & Rosenthal, supra note 31. 
  34. BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM, supra note 1, at 28. 
  35. BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM, supra note 1, at 20–21; Bacon, True Directions, supra note 
1, at 54. 
  36. BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM, supra note 1, at 21. 
  37. See generally PLATO, Republic, in COMPLETE WORKS 1132 (John M. Cooper ed., 1997). 
  38. See generally Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, See What You Want to See: Motivational 
Influences on Visual Perception, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 612 (2006); Peter H. Ditto 
& David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria for Preferred and 
Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568 (1992); Ziva Kunda, The 
Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990). Dror 
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crimes.
39 Charlton et al. found that fingerprint examiners are indeed highly 
motivated  to  catch  criminals,  especially  in  high  profile  or  serious  cases.
40 
While such motivation is not surprising, and indeed may be valuable, it also 
may lead to bias or overeagerness to find a “solution” (that is, cognitive clo-
sure). 
  Motivational bias is not a new phenomenon and has been well studied and 
documented in many areas.
41 It has not been sufficiently studied, however, 
within the forensic science domain. Motivation has many forms and comes in 
a variety of disguises. For example, having a target to compare to may cause 
motivated perception that affects what an expert examiner may see in the ac-
tual evidence.
42 An illustration of such effects in forensic science is when evi-
dence of an image of the perpetrator car’s registration plate number is matched 
against a “target” registration number of a known suspect, causing potential 
bias in the perception of the evidence so that it fits the target.
43 
  The issues are not simple. Take for example the nature of ACE-V, the ac-
cepted and widely used procedure for latent fingerprint examination (friction 
ridge analysis), which is comprised of the following steps: Analysis, Compari-
son, Evaluation, and Verification.
44 The Scientific Working Group on Friction 
Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST) indicates that ACE-V is 
circular in nature, stating specifically that this “[m]ethod of [f]riction [r]idge 
[e]xaminations” is a “recurring application of . . . (ACE-V).”
45 This means 
that after comparison and evaluation of the latent print in relation to the sus-
pect “target” ten-print, examiners can go back to their initial analysis, reana-
lyze the evidence, and modify their initial perception of it. 
  This allows the comparison and evaluation to the target ten-print to influ-
ence the analysis of the actual evidence, and thereby opens the door to moti-
vated  perception  and  a  whole  set  of  cognitive  biases  and  influences.  An 
attempt at a solution to this problem may entail imposing a linear nature to 
ACE-V, whereby analysis of the latent prints is conducted independently of 
the comparison and evaluation, and a return to the analysis stage and reanaly-
sis after exposure to the suspect target ten-print during the comparison and 
evaluation stages is not allowed.  
 
                                                                                                           
  39. David Charlton et al., Emotional Experiences and Motivating Factors Associated with 
Fingerprint Analysis, J. FORENSIC SCI. (forthcoming 2010). 
  40. Id. 
  41. See generally, e.g., Karl Ask & Pär Anders Granhag, Motivational Bias in Criminal 
Investigators’  Judgments  of  Witness  Reliability,  37  J.  APPLIED  SOC.  PSYCHOL.  561  (2007); 
Balcetis & Dunning, supra note 38. 
  42. Itiel Dror, Biased Brains, 116 POLICE REV. 20 (2008). 
  43. Id. 
  44.  SCIENTIFIC  WORKING  GROUP  ON  FRICTION  RIDGE  ANALYSIS,  STUDY  AND  TECH. 
(SWGFAST), FRICTION RIDGE EXAMINATION METHODOLOGY FOR LATENT PRINT EXAM’RS 2 
(2002),  http://www.swgfast.org/Friction_Ridge_Examination_Methodology_for_Latent_Print_Examiners 
_1.01.pdf. 
  45. SWGFAST establishes guidelines and standards for the forensic examination of finger-
prints, palm prints, and foot prints. Id. (emphasis added).   Human Biases in Forensic Science 
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  The examination of a latent  print against a suspect ten-print, however, 
may also allow examiners to notice certain bits of information by directing 
their attention to those areas that do require special attention and further proc-
essing. Hence, rejecting a circular nature to ACE-V fingerprint matching and 
imposing a linear procedure may be “throwing out the baby with the bath wa-
ter.” The problems are complex, and there is no simple answer.   
  A solution may entail imposing an initial analysis of the latent print in 
isolation from the target, but also allow, with clear and detailed documenta-
tion, retroactive changes after comparison to the target ten-print. The solution 
not only must include documentation of such “reanalysis” influenced by the 
exposure to the target, but also may require distinguishing during the initial 
analysis those characteristics that are strong and cannot be changed after expo-
sure to the target from weaker characteristics that are liable to modification. 
The implications and dangers of different procedures, such as acceptance of 
low quality latent prints that do not contain sufficient information for compari-
son (or, in contrast, rejecting latent prints that are low in quality but are still 
sufficient  for comparison),  need to be carefully considered. The discussion 
above is only an illustration that methods should be developed with caution so 
they do not fall prey to Bacon’s idols. 
  Idola specus go beyond motivation, as they include how individuals see 
themselves and with whom they identify. Research has yet to examine whether 
forensic examiners’ affiliation with police or their own perceived role in crime 
fighting, or both, may influence their observations and analysis. It is clear, 
however, that this is a point to which forensic science, as a science, must pay 
careful attention, taking precautions to ensure that such affiliations and alle-
giances have no (or as minimal as possible) effects on objective and scientific 
work within forensics. One solution is to separate forensic laboratories from 
law enforcement agencies.
46 Such a move may have positive results in terms of 
minimizing (or even eliminating) police influences. 
  There are three points to consider, however. First, what are the advantages 
(if any) of having forensic laboratories within law enforcement agencies? If 
there are any (and there clearly are some advantages), how important are they? 
And how do they weigh and balance against idola specus and risks from these 
affiliations? Second, might there be ways to keep forensic laboratories within 
law  enforcement  agencies  but  to  take  actions  to  counter  the  idola  specus? 
What are these actions, and how effective can they be? Third, we must recog-
nize that by removing the forensic laboratories from law enforcement agen-
cies, they will not be void of context and affiliation. They must be located 
somewhere, and in any environment there inevitably will be context, affilia-
tion, and allegiances. Might new or different settings raise new concerns? It 
                                                                                                           
  46. Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for 
Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 478 (1997); Paul C. Giannelli, 
Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
163, 227–28 (2007); COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., 
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could be that moving forensic laboratories out of one context, by itself, may 
solve one problem, but bring about another problem. The point here is not to 
resolve this complex and difficult question, but rather to frame it as an exam-
ple  of  idola  specus,  one  deserving  serious  and  considered  attention.  These 
questions of affiliation and the potential biases that they create also relate to 
communications and interconnections between people, the subject of our next 
set of Baconian idols, idola fori. 
 
III. IDOLA FORI (IDOLS OF THE MARKET) 
 
  By the very “intercourse and association of men with each other,” distor-
tions of the truth arise.
47 What others think, and our interactions and commu-
nications with fellow examiners and detectives, may affect our ability to do a 
proper scientific observation and inquiry. One of the issues that has received 
little scientific research and examination is the verification process, one stage 
in the ACE-V method.
48 The idea behind verification is that by having a sec-
ond (or even third) examiner do his or her own analysis,  we can  have in-
creased confidence in the conclusions reached by latent fingerprint examiners. 
But there has been quite a debate on how verification needs to take place. In-
terestingly, known erroneous identifications, such as Mayfield
49 and Cowans,
50 
were not detected during the verification stage (nor by the defense experts). 
  Verification is clearly important and needed. However, what it entails and 
when to apply it is less clear. For example, is one verification sufficient or are 
two verifications needed? Should all conclusions be verified or only matches? 
Is blind verification essential? And what does “blind” verification mean (blind 
to the decision itself, to the reasons why it was reached, to who made the ini-
tial  decision,  to  the  fact  that  there  was  already  an  initial  decision,  and  so 
forth)? What is clear is that verification is important, and that there are many 
ways to implement it. There seem, however, to be very few, if any at all, scien-
tific experimental studies that have systematically examined, evaluated, and 
compared the different ways of doing verifications or that have determined 
whether the verifier knowing that he or she is “verifying” makes a difference. 
Such studies and experimentally based procedures for assessing verification 
are essential for countering idola fori and for establishing forensics as a sci-
ence. 
  Understanding how “knowledge” matters, and what should or should not 
be communicated in order to minimize bias and other cognitive effects, will 
undoubtedly improve the field. For example, verifiers rarely find errors; there-
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fore, naturally, it is hard to keep motivation high, and there is a cognitive bias 
to verify. I suggest that a simple way to improve the quality of verification is 
to intentionally include, occasionally, a similar nonmatch pair of prints in the 
verification  processes.  Similar  solutions  already  have  been  implemented  in 
airport security where x-ray operators examine bags.
51 Such measures in foren-
sic science are relatively easy to implement, cost very little, and allow im-
proved processes as well as quality control. 
  Scientific studies will provide insights that will enable greater efficiency 
in forensic work from a practical perspective. For example, I have suggested 
that the need for verification, and what sort of verification, may be highly de-
pendent on the difficulty of the decision and the type and likelihood for a po-
tential error. In cases with greater cognitive difficulty, when errors are more 
likely, more stringent verification procedures are needed; whereas more simple 
and straightforward prints may not require the same level and type of verifica-
tion. Hence, studies on verification can not only provide understandings that 
will allow better forensic science to be more of a science, but they will enable 
forensic scientists to work wisely, using this knowledge to develop more ap-
propriate and efficient—as well as cost effective—verification procedures. 
  But idola fori focuses mainly on language.
52 Language has profound ef-
fects  on  how  we  think  and  perceive  information,  and  even  how  we  see 
things.
53 Furthermore, the terminology, vocabulary and jargon we use can gen-
erate mistakes because we use it without attention, without proper focus on its 
true meaning, and without measurable criteria, definition, and quantification. 
Take,  for  example,  firearms  identification.  Language  is  clearly  a  potential 
problem when an examiner declares a match between two visual patterns be-
cause  of  sufficient  “similarity,”  when  similarity  is  an  unspecified  quantum 
based on the examiner’s own experience.
54 The terms similar and match are 
inherently vague. If the examiners were to look for identical patterns, then the 
issue would be much easier. What we would need to agree on is the level of 
granularity and resolution to declare two things “identical,” as two things are 
never exactly the same at some level of granularity. 
  In firearms, as well as in other forensic domains, the patterns instead are 
judged by “similarity”—a similarity that enables one to conclude that the two 
patterns are so similar that one can accurately conclude that they originate 
                                                                                                           
  51. Threat Image Projection (TIP) software occasionally adds threat items, such as knives 
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from the same source.
55 The vagueness of the term similarity, though, raises 
the questions of what level of similarity is required, and how similar do the 
two impressions need to be. Forensic science may well fall prey to the traps of 
idola fori when examiners use language without attention, without proper fo-
cus on meaning, and without measurable criteria, definition, and quantification 
for critical terms that stand at the crux of their conclusions, such as “similar-
ity” or “consistent with.” 
  The Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners (AFTE) Theory of 
Identification was formalized in 1985 and published in the AFTE Journal.
56 
This  theory  specifies  the  basis  for  comparing  and  identifying  firearms  and 
toolmarks. It states that “[t]he theory of identification as it pertains to the com-
parison of toolmarks enables opinions of common origin to be made when the 
unique surface contours of two toolmarks are in ‘sufficient agreement.’”
57 And 
it  further  states  that  “[c]urrently  the  interpretation  of  individualiza-
tion/identification is subjective in nature, founded on scientific principles and 
based  on  the  examiner’s  training  and  experience.”
58  The  potential  problem 
here is the nonscientific nature of the identification criteria. If the comparison 
of toolmarks enables conclusions about common origin when the unique sur-
face contours of two toolmarks are in “sufficient agreement,” what is the sci-
entific  definition  and  measurement  of  what  constitutes  such  “sufficient 
agreement”? It seems that it is more in the eye of the beholder than strict sci-
entific measures because it is determined without specific quantification and 
criteria. This subjective identification criterion has been criticized as unscien-
tific and characterized as a central pitfall.
59 
  The subjective and unspecified identification criterion of sufficient agree-
ment is an example of idola fori. Furthermore, the AFTE Theory of Identifica-
tion stipulation that the determination of “sufficient agreement is the product 
of  the  examiner’s  personal  training,  skills,  and  experience”
60  also  involves 
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idola  specus—the  subjective  individual’s  experience  determines  decisions, 
rather than scientifically measurable criteria based on objective, quantifiable 
measurement divorced from and independent of the specific incidental indi-
vidual who is making the observations. The vagueness of “sufficient similar-
ity” is idola fori, and then the dangers of idola specus are introduced to fill in 
this vagueness. Without measurable, validated criteria, the dangers of confir-
mation bias and seeing what we expect to see are greater. The same issues and 
potential  problems  apply  to  other  forensic  domains,  such  as  tire  and  shoe 
prints, bite and ear marks, handwriting, and even fingerprints.
61 
  A striking example of how lack of definitions and standards can lead to 
bias in forensic science is in the perception and evaluation of bruises. The age 
of a bruise can be determined by its color, whereby the color yellow, for exam-
ple, indicates that it is not recent.
62 However, research shows that this classi-
fication system is based and dependent on what is regarded as “yellow” and 
that there is a lack of consistency in evaluating whether a bruise is yellow or 
not.
63  
  Even more striking is how this has introduced bias, rather than just entail-
ing a relatively simple fix through standards and training. In response to the 
issues with determining if a bruise is yellow, a forensic physician stated in a 
published Letter to the Editor that “when asked the age of a bruise, I turn the 
question round, and ask how old it is thought to be,”
64 thus, adding potentially 
biasing contextual information rather than finding ways to agree what consti-
tutes “yellow.” Furthermore, in the letter, the forensic physician finally adds, 
“I would suggest that adoption of these policies, would lead to less red faces in 
the witness box!”
65 
  In Baconian terms, the idola fori, those idols imposed on understanding by 
words, are of two kinds: (1) words for things that do not exist and (2) words 
that are misleading.
66 I have already discussed the vagueness of “yellow” and a 
very commonly used forensic term, “similarity.” How about “individualiza-
tion”? This term is used by fingerprint examiners who may conclude “indi-
vidualization” to exclude all others.
67 Is a more probabilistic language more 
robust? Would that help us resist idola fori and encourage precision that would 
make these fields more accurate and scientific? 
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  Language  and  idola  fori  relate  also  to  how  systems  communicate  and 
work. Thus, they also pertain to organizational structures and the flow of in-
formation within and between different entities. This relates to the way foren-
sic  work is carried out. For  example,  Larry  S. Miller shows  how different 
modes of conducting forensic examinations (in Miller’s study, hair analysis) 
affect the accuracy of the conclusions reached by examiners (similar to issues 
with eyewitness lineup identification processes).
68 Koppl suggests that this is a 
main problem within forensics, and that combating and safeguarding against 
these idola fori should take place at an organizational level.
69 He emphasizes 
the importance of forensic science administration, thus increasing the objectiv-
ity of forensic science by reorganizing forensic work.
70 Koppl’s argument is 
that some institutional structures are better for scientific inquiry than others.
71 
Because of the current way forensic analysis is carried out, a given laboratory 
often has a monopoly on the work. By introducing cross-laboratory examina-
tion of the same evidence, competition will increase incentives for error detec-
tion and prevention, thus creating a more scientific forensic discipline.
72 The 
suggestions for a more scientific forensic discipline via administration are built 
on constructing new institutional epistemic designs.
73 
 
IV. IDOLA THEATRI (OF THE “THEATRE”) 
 
  Like idola specus, idola theatri are “made” and are not inherent to our 
make-up (unlike the idola tribus). These idols are divided into three kinds: so-
phistical, based on just a few anecdotal observations (or even no experimental 
empirical evidence); empirical, based on narrow research; and superstitious, 
based on unsupported or blind belief.
74 What is forensics based on? To what 
extent is it based on broad systematic scientific research? And to what extent 
is it based on narrow or even anecdotal in-house research and observations? 
As noted at the outset of the paper, forensic science is not a unitary field; it en-
compasses a whole spectrum of disciplines. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to systematically examine each forensic discipline and to assess its basis. Fur-
thermore,  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  paper  to  reach  a  conclusion  about 
whether forensic science is scientific. So, I leave it open to what extent, if at 
all, each forensic discipline is sophistical, empirical, or superstitious, or is in 
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fact scientifically based. It is important, however, to discuss idola theatri to see 
if there are any issues surrounding the Superstitious idol. 
  This type of idola theatri distinguishes between what an examiner actually 
knows and what is merely believed. It is a well accepted principle in science 
that data undermine theory, not vice versa. How much, and to what extent (if 
at all), do forensic examiners accept their science without proper and sufficient 
questioning? How much of what they do is a matter of belief, a type of idola 
theatri, and how much of what they do is a matter of scientific knowledge? 
These questions are worth examination and can mark problem areas that need 
to be addressed for the purpose of increasing the science in forensic science. 
We  must  minimize,  if  not  avoid  all  together,  “idols  which  have  crept  into 
men’s minds from the various dogmas of peculiar systems . . . creating ficti-
tious and theatrical worlds.”
75 
  Up to this stage, the idola tribus, fori, and specus all present obstacles that 
prevent us from true scientific observation and analysis. Any movement for-
ward  for improving forensic science, however, also  has  to overcome those 
well- and deep-rooted cultural issues that relate to belief—those that result 
from what Bacon called “fictitious” realities.
76 These are especially challeng-
ing, as no one likes his or her beliefs to be questioned, and any examination of 
beliefs often meets strong opposition and denial. As such, they are hard to dis-
cuss and can produce strong obstacles in the way of necessary improvements. 
If forensic examiners blindly believe in their ways, accepting forensic science 
without question or doubt, then these idols are especially hard to deal with. 
This form of resistance is, perhaps, part of human nature. No one likes to en-
tertain the possibility of being wrong or having sent innocent people to incar-
ceration.  But  defensiveness  and  lack  of  openness  to  discuss  and  examine 
potential idols in forensic science can be a serious obstacle that prevents foren-
sic science from broadening and strengthening its scientific bases. 
  Let  me  illustrate  the  nature  of  some  of  these  cultural  issues.  When  it 
comes to human error, there is a whole literature of scientific studies spanning 
over 100 years. The literature clearly shows that the question is not whether 
humans make mistakes, but when and under what conditions they make them. 
In forensics, however, there has been significant resistance to admitting the 
possibility of error or to measuring its frequency or causes. There has been a 
strong belief that errors in forensic science are not a significant problem, but 
this belief has not been empirically tested in an adequate way. Examination, 
reflection, and criticism should be important and welcomed elements in foren-
sic science. Identifying weaknesses and taking actions and countermeasures to 
avoid or at least to limit them must underpin any science, and forensic science 
is no exception. Weaknesses and human errors as discussed until now in Ba-
con’s idols were only minimally related to belief and culture. Bacon’s idola 
theatri have underpinned modern sciences by acknowledging these issues. De-
nying their very existence has been a problem in forensic science. 
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  Examples to illustrate such idols in forensic science are not rare. See, for 
instance, the published Letter to the Editor in the journal, Police Review (June 
13, 2008), in response to an article about “Biased Brains.”
77 The formal re-
sponse of the Chair of the International Fingerprint Society stated that any fin-
gerprint examiner who is susceptible to bias is “an incompetent idiot.”
78 Or see 
another Letter to the Editor, this time to the professional journal of the Finger-
print Society, in which the chairman of the Fingerprint Society publicly states 
that any examiner that is susceptible to contextual bias or confirmation bias 
should not be a fingerprint examiner and needs to “seek employment in Dis-
neyland.”
79  These  hardly  represent  a  culture  of  openness  and  examination 
aimed at finding weaknesses and improving the domain by providing proper 
safeguards and best practices. It is a response that reflects a belief in the pure 
objectivity of the forensic examination, and a response not based on scientific 
debate. 
  The point is that idola tribus are inevitable; they are part of what it means 
to be human. To declare that any examiner susceptible to them should not be 
in the field is to be beset by misunderstanding and superstition. The cultural 
issue of belief in forensic examination is well illustrated in another example. 
After the Madrid bomber erroneous identification,
80 one would expect, given 
that confirmation bias has been recognized as a contributing factor to the erro-
neous identification,
81 that this and other cognitive biases will be a central part 
of a sourcebook in this area. Therefore, I submitted for this book a chapter 
dealing with these difficult issues.
82 The chapter was reviewed, revised, and 
officially accepted for publication. Before publication, however, the editors 
removed it from the collection. Among other reasons, the editors justified their 
decision to exclude the chapter by stating they believed its inclusion in the 
sourcebook would damage the “widespread acceptance of the Sourcebook”
83 
because fingerprint examiners would not be comfortable with what the evi-
dence about confirmation bias shows. 
  These examples are just anecdotal illustrations of a defensive and closed 
attitude exhibited by some within the forensic science community. Accepting 
mistakes and errors as part of human nature and cognitive processes is an inte-
gral part of science. For example, in the fingerprint domain, examiners who 
make an error are subject to disciplinary actions and even dismissal. But errors 
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are part of life—they are to be acknowledged, managed, and minimized, not 
swept  under  the  rug.  These  are  exactly  the  idols  that  Francis  Bacon  dis-
cussed—those idols that in fact prevent science. Rather than welcoming and 
demanding research that attempts to scrutinize the field, some have resisted it 
through ad hominem personal attacks,
84 while others have engaged in-house 
research aimed at proving that the naked emperor is wearing clothes.
85 Re-
search in-house in a system that culturally has a problem with acknowledging 
that errors do occur, and where belief in the current system is strong, often re-
sults in research that is too narrow and not derived from theoretical under-
standing and an adequate conceptual framework. Such research also may be 
self-interested, motivated to promote and validate existing procedures, and too 
close to the politics or ideology or persons at the work place, therefore suffer-
ing from many of Bacon’s idols. It is difficult for forensic scientists to admit to 
error. Not only does idola theatri make this hard because error is contrary to 
much of their belief system, but also they rarely see and confront their errors. 
  In contrast to other domains, such as medicine, the military, and finance, 
where errors are “in your face” because of the death of a patient, friendly fire, 
or clear loss of funds, in the forensic domain, errors are rarely known. Cases 
like  Mayfield
86  and  Cowans
87  require  very  unusual  circumstances,  without 
which we may never know an error has even occurred. Furthermore, the errors 
discussed are not the kind of which examiners would be aware. On the con-
trary, these errors, and Bacon’s idols, are ingrained and inherent to forensic 
examiners  who  are  doing  their  job  as  dedicated,  hard  working,  and  well-
intended experts.
88 
  The extensive National Research Council (NRC) inquiry into forensic sci-
ence
89 has acknowledged  “the findings of cognitive psychology on the po-
tential  for  bias  and  error  in  human  observers”  and  further  stated  that 
“[u]nfortunately, at least to date, there is no good evidence to indicate that the 
forensic science community has made a sufficient effort to address the bias 
issue.”
90 Moreover, the NRC committee found that “the extent to which practi-
tioners  in  a  particular  forensic  discipline  rely  on  human  interpretation  that 
could be tainted by error, [or] the threat of bias . . . . [is] significant.”
91 It also 
recommended that 
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[t]he National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) should encourage research 
programs on human observer bias and sources of human error in forensic ex-
aminations. Such programs might include studies to determine the effects of 
contextual bias in forensic practice (e.g., studies to determine whether and to 
what extent the results of forensic analyses are influenced by knowledge re-
garding the background of the suspect and the investigator’s theory of the 
case).
92 
Finally, the committee stated that 
[i]n addition, research on sources of human error should be closely linked 
with research conducted to quantify and characterize the amount of error. 
Based on the results of these studies, and in consultation with its advisory 
board, NIFS should develop standard operating procedures (that will lay the 
foundation for model protocols) to minimize, to the greatest extent reasona-
bly possible, potential bias and sources of human error in forensic practice.
93 
  Bacon’s idols are, of course, not an exhaustive list of obstacles facing fo-
rensics in establishing and strengthening itself as a scientific discipline, but 
they do provide a useful framework for discussing some elements that need to 
be addressed in establishing and improving the scientific basis of forensic sci-
ence. Some areas of forensics are more advanced than others, but like all sci-
entific domains, there is always a place for constant examination, reflection, 
and improvements. For forensic science to advance and improve (which I hope 
we all accept as a shared goal), we must behave as scientists. “Scientists con-
tinually observe, test, and modify the body of knowledge. Rather than claim-
ing absolute truth, science approaches truth either through breakthrough dis-
coveries or incrementally, by testing theories repeatedly.”
94 The discussions in 
this paper in no way attempt to declare that forensic science is lacking in sci-
entific rigor, nor do they claim that forensics is scientifically based. The dis-
cussions  aim  to  critically  examine  and  question  some  elements  in  forensic 
science, to look for points of weakness, to identify potential problems that may 
need to be addressed, and to offer some recommendations for improvement. 
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